The South China Sea is the site for China’s integrated maritime campaign for expansion against its smaller and weaker Southeast Asian neighbors. China aims to gain legitimacy for its unilateral territorial claims over the vast marine terrain, several surface and subsurface land features, and natural resources above and below the seabed. China deploys its three services in its campaign against the coastal Southeast Asia states. The first layer is the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), with its numerous and advanced naval vessels to provide it with the escalatory option of the threat or actual use of force. The second layer is the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), which ensures the occasional presence of Chinese maritime forces in the disputed waters. Finally, the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is tasked with maintaining a persistent presence in the contested maritime terrain of the South China Sea.
The PLAN and the CCG operate to normalize patrol activities to maintain China’s rights and interests in the South China Sea and, if necessary, respond to sudden maritime incidents involving the navies and coast guards of the smaller Southeast Asian states. The PLAN, the CCG, and maritime militias are tasked to promote China’s economic activities in the disputed waters while obstructing the economic activities of its smaller neighboring states. China’s integrated maritime campaign for expansion seeks two objectives: a.) de facto — or the imposition of a state of affairs based on raw power and use of force; and, b.) de jure — earning the legal recognition of China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea through international law.
In 2013, the Philippines filed a case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) to deny China the possibility that it could accomplish the second goal of its integrated maritime expansion — the legitimacy of its expansive naval claim in the South China Sea. In 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) decided that China’s legal basis for its expansive claim — the nine-dash-line — is a completely untenable claim because it has no basis in international law. The tribunal ruled that since China became a party to the UNCLOS, it could not legally claim to have historic rights in areas beyond 12 nautical miles from its coast. The tribunal further pointed out that there was no evidence to support China’s landmark claim in the South China Sea. By ruling that China’s nine-dash line claim has no legal basis and is groundless, the arbitral court effectively deprived China of any chance to gain de jure control of the South China Sea.
THE UNCLOS AWARD AS THE BASIS OF AN ARCHIPELAGIC DEFENSE DOCTRINEPresident Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. said in an interview before his inauguration as president on June 30, 2022 that he would assert the Philippines’ territorial rights over the West Philippine Sea. He said he would talk with China consistently with a firm voice about the two countries’ territorial dispute. He also declared that he would use the July 2016 arbitral awards against China’s expansive and sweeping claims in the South China Sea to assert his country’s territorial rights.
On July 12, 2022, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo announced that the Philippines would uphold the July 12, 2016, arbitral ruling as it is one of the twin anchors of the country’s policy and actions on the West Philippine Sea. He added that the award affirmed to the community of nations that the rule of law prevails. That stability, peace, and progress can only be attained when founded on a rules-based legal order on the oceans, as it should be everywhere else. In the Department of Foreign Affairs’ (DFA) July 12, 2022 statement commemorating the 6th anniversary of the arbitral award and the 40th anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Secretary Manalo declared that compliance with UNCLOS in its entirety is critical to ensuring global and regional peace and the fair and sustainable use of the oceans.
Since 2023, President Marcos Jr. has pursued a vigorous balancing policy based on the July 12 arbitral ruling to challenge China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. Specifically, this balancing policy entails building up the Philippine military’s external defense capabilities, enhancing its alliance with the US by increasing American strategic presence in the Philippines and fostering security arrangements with other American allies like South Korea, Japan, and Australia, and, more recently, adopting the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC).
Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro announced the gist of CADC in January 2024. CADC incorporates President Marcos Jr.’s view that China’s activities aimed to implement its 10-dash line claim (Recently expanded from nine dashes. — Ed.) in the South China Sea is not only a blatant disregard of UNCLOS and of the July 12, 2016, arbitral tribunal ruling, China’s actions are a major strategic threat to Philippine national security. The CADC directs the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to develop and project its capabilities up to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and expand the country’s strategic depth to enhance the defense of its entire archipelagic territory. CADC’s long-term goal is to guarantee the unimpeded and peaceful exploration and exploitation of all the natural resources with the country’s EEZ for Philippine nationals, corporations, and others authorized by the Philippine government. This implies a more comprehensive and defiant strategy against Chinese maritime expansion grounded on the July 12, 2016, UNCLOS award to the Philippines.
Dr. Renato De Castro is a trustee, convenor, and non-resident fellow of the think tank Stratbase ADR Institute. He is also a distinguished full professor at the Department of International Studies at De La Salle University-Manila.
