The now-viral image of a bloodied Donald Trump defiantly raising his fist moments after a gunman narrowly missed his head last Sunday seems to symbolize the increasingly steep hurdle Democrats face in the run up to the US presidential elections in less than four months.
All his opponents needed was for a black swan kind of event (no, I do not think it was staged since it would simply have been too risky to aim for just his ear at any distance, even for an expert marksman) to hand his camp such a public image boost on a silver platter. And this after public opinion polls have shown that Mr. Trump has emerged virtually unscathed from his conviction in May on 34 counts of falsifying business records.
So, is a Trump 2.0 presidency after November a foregone conclusion?
Perhaps, but as any seasoned political campaign vet would tell us: anything can still turn the tide down the homestretch… like another black swan event.
Having said that, any prudent government and business organization must already have been drawing up scenarios under Trump 2.0, and I do know that some of our own top economic planners have been doing just that since 2024 began.
Mr. Trump has been known for his protectionist streak that miffed major trade partners, not the least China — but what will another presidency under him mean for our own interests, this time in the West Philippine Sea (WPS)?
In order to whip up a quick projection in this issue (yup, I had planned to write on something completely different before last Sunday), I engaged two friends on separate brief chats in the past days:
• Robin Michael U. Garcia, president at opinion research company WR Numero Research and associate professor at the Political Economy Program of the School of Law and Governance of the University of Asia & the Pacific who obtained his International Politics Ph.D. from the School of International Relations and Public Affairs of Fudan University, Shanghai;
• And, Herman Joseph S. Kraft, former chairman of the Political Science department at the University of the Philippines (Diliman campus) who got his Strategic Studies Master’s degree at the Australian National University and is one of Philippine analysts with actual professional experience in either national security or diplomatic fields (or both).
At the time of our chats, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. had yet to deliver his latest State of the Nation Address (which he will give next Monday, July 22), Mr. Trump had yet to address the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee (July 18), and China President Xi Jinping had yet to give his marching orders at the closed-door Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (July 15-18), so we did not have the benefit of those crucial inputs.
What is clear to both analysts is that there is bipartisan agreement in the US that China is its top strategic rival. Unlike the former Soviet Union, which turned out to be a paper tiger due to its floundering economy, China deserves the title, “superpower,” hands down, since its political and military might is backed solidly by its economic prowess (yes, growth there has been slowing, but it remains the world’s second biggest economy nonetheless).
Hence, both Republicans and Democrats can be expected to remain tough on China in the next administration, particularly in trade (both the Trump and Biden administrations slapped hefty tariffs on Chinese products — including steel, aluminum, solar panels, semiconductors, electric vehicles, and other products — deemed riding on unfair trade practices), thus prolonging a tit-for-tat trade war that will continue to weigh on all other economies worldwide. Mr. Trump had already pledged back in February to slap a new 60% duty on products from China and 10% on goods from elsewhere. Bloomberg just this week cited recent research by the UBS Group AG that this tack would more than halve China’s growth rate. And that will have a telling effect even for a country like the Philippines for which, while foreign trade may not account for as much of the economy as it does among its neighbors, China remains the biggest trade partner nevertheless and is a choice expansion target of major Philippine firms.
Having said that, Democrats and Republicans “differ in operationalizing” the US rivalry with China when it comes to the strategic politico-military security sphere, Messrs. Garcia and Kraft noted.
Unlike the current US administration, which Mr. Garcia notes has been more supportive of the US’ global commitments to such multilateral arrangements as those under the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Mr. Trump’s record (for instance, as regards organizations such as the World Health Organization and NATO) has shown him adhering more to the “relative gains” approach to international relations, whereby states ensure they have an edge especially over rivals by relying primarily on themselves, rather than on bilateral or multilateral cooperation that necessarily curb sovereignty to some degree.
And so, while the Biden government has shown itself more ready to adhere to “lofty global principles and ideals” as a way of pursuing US interests in the long term, a prospective Trump administration can be expected to continue realpolitik even in carrying out US relations with allies. And that, Mr. Garcia contends, means that should the next US administration deem that its resources are stretched too thinly from Ukraine, to the Middle East and to Taiwan (with the South China Sea seemingly a sub chapter of this theme) — thereby putting already-sagging US credibility in its alliances even more in doubt — then everyone should be ready for the possibility of the US pulling back from its current avowed “iron-clad” commitment to allies like the Philippines when push comes to shove in the West Philippine Sea. Being a businessman at heart, for Trump, every strategic calculation “in the final analysis, will be more about the deal” to be made, Mr. Kraft said. Which regional concern could take a back seat? It may not be the best indicator, but a cursory review of even Mr. Biden’s remarks may show Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas war are top of mind in Washington, perhaps because both are raging wars.
Perhaps a sign of things to come may be gleaned from Mr. Trump’s recent reply to a Bloomberg Businessweek question on the US commitment to Taiwan’s defense: that the US was “no different” from “an insurance company” and that Taiwan “doesn’t give us anything,” according to a July 17 article of The Guardian.
Even the current assurance from Mr. Biden himself (there was no such explicit statement from his predecessor) that the US commitment to the Philippines under their Mutual Defense Treaty is “iron clad” sounds hollow in the shadow of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. That incident saw China taking effective control of that maritime feature about 120 miles from the Philippines — putting it well within our 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) — after we heeded the US’ call for both sides to stand down and withdraw ships, thus, practically handing the area to China on a silver platter.
The US failed us there, and China — which ignored the US call — knows it. Now, Beijing is firming up its knowledge on the extent of US commitment to its allies, with the WPS as its laboratory for this test.
So where does this leave the Philippines? We must be clear on our objectives in our WPS initiatives because, in the final analysis, we are on our own, gains in getting our regional and western allies more actively involved in this area notwithstanding.
I recall envying Vietnam for standing up to its larger northern neighbor — to the point of even fighting border clashes that left the former bloodied. But the Middle Kingdom learned to treat it with respect, although that may also be due to the existence of relations between their communist parties — a facility which we do not have.
So, it was a relief to see the current Philippine administration putting up a fight of sorts in our own way — through the transparency initiative that saw us documenting almost every tense engagement in the WPS and broadcasting it to the world. That seemed a fitting follow-up to our landmark legal victory through the July 2016 arbitral ruling vs the basis for China’s extensive claim to much of the South China Sea and goes in tandem with our continuing diplomatic protests, what with more and more western and like-minded Asian countries agreeing to ramp up defense ties with the Philippines and even engaging in joint patrols through the West Philippine Sea. Showing that it is smarting from a resulting adverse international image, the Philippines has increasingly been in the sights of China’s Foreign ministry spokesmen, and Chinese coast guard personnel have taken to taking videos of WPS standoffs as well, although the latter may be more for its domestic propaganda.
But what is the objective? We are, in our own way, getting our allies to help apply the 2016 ruling by ensuring freedom of navigation in the area, and putting on legal record China’s aggression through diplomatic protests and videos of specific incidents. But to what end?
Do we have a clear game plan here? Former Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza said in a recent TV interview with the ABS-CBN News Channel that the Philippines increasingly risks missing the boat in following up our historic 2016 legal victory with another arbitration case, this time to sue China for massive environmental damage from its island-building over coral reefs within our EEZ. This administration is nearly halfway through its term, and the 2025 and 2028 elections are sure to occupy the minds of lawmakers and decision makers.
Foreign media reported on July 4 that India Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Kazakhstan where both agreed to step up talks to end their simmering border conflict that saw at least 20 Indian and four Chinese troops die in July 2020. Are we on the way to such top-level engagement?
The Philippines and China do have an annual framework for talks, called the bilateral consultation mechanism (BCM), and the 9th such meeting last July 2 ended with both sides saying they had “frank (China used the word ‘candid’) and constructive discussions” especially after the July 17 incident near Ayungin Shoal where a Philippine sailor was injured. “Frank” and “candid” are diplomatic euphemisms for difficult talks.
While the China press release said “[t]he two sides agreed to continue to maintain dialogue and consultation through the BCM and other mechanisms to handle differences and disagreements. During the meeting, the two sides also had an exchange on improving the maritime communication mechanism, promoting the dialogue between the coast guard of the two countries and advancing cooperation in marine science and technology and environmental protection, among other fields,” the Philippine statement recalled that “both sides recognized that there is a need to restore trust, rebuild confidence, and create conditions conducive to productive dialogue and interaction,” that they “affirmed their commitment to de-escalate tensions without prejudice to their respective positions,” and that “significant differences remain” even as they agreed to continue talks towards a “mutually acceptable solution.” Just read between the lines to see the differences there, starting with the Philippines citing the need for ensuring that conditions are conducive for talks in the first place.
Cursory talks with Philippine business leaders show that this maritime spat has begun to hurt local companies, which want bilateral talks to pick up soonest.
Will all our actions, so far, in this issue help us negotiate from a position of strength and encourage the other side to be sincere when our top officials finally meet, or have we managed to just piss off the fellow sitting on the other side of the table?
And so, we will be watching for clear signals here when Mr. Marcos addresses the nation on Monday.
Wilfredo G. Reyes was editor-in-chief of BusinessWorld from 2020 through 2023.
